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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DOUBLE JEOPARDY-Prosecu-
tions by both a City and a State for an Identical Offense 
as a Violation of the Prohibition Against Double 
Jeopardy-Waller v. State* 
Joseph Waller and a group of others detached a mural from a 
wall of the city hall in St. Petersburg, Florida. They paraded with 
the mural through the streets until they were confronted by the 
local police, who recovered the city's property after a brief scuffle. 
As a result of that incident, Waller was charged with two municipal 
offenses: destruction of city property and disorderly breach of the 
peace. He was tried in municipal court, found guilty, and sentenced 
on both charges. Subsequently, the state of Florida charged Waller 
with grand larceny under a state statute, and he was tried and con-
victed again. Waller appealed the larceny conviction on the ground 
that it was barred by his prior conviction in the municipal prosecu-
tion-that he was being placed in jeopardy twice in violation of the 
Constitution of the United States.1 In denying his appeal, a Florida 
district court of appeal ruled that even if it assumed that the 
municipal offenses were included in the offense of grand larceny2-
a point it neither conceded nor decided-the double prosecution 
was allowable under Florida case law.3 The Supreme Court of the 
United States has granted certiorari to decide the question.4 
The Court has not previously considered whether the proceed-
ings in a prosecution for the violation of a city ordinance place a 
defendant in "jeopardy" so as to preclude prosecution by another 
• 213 S.2d 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 221 S.2d 749 (Fla. 1968), cert. 
granted, 395 U.S. 975 (1969). The Supreme Court of the United States has heard 
argument on Waller but has not yet rendered its decision. 
I. Brief for Appellant at 14-18, Waller v. State, 213 S.2d 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1968). The fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides in part: 
"No person shall • . • be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb • . • ." Waller claimed that the subsequent prosecution for larceny 
also violated the Florida Declaration of Rights No. 12: "No person shall be subject 
to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense ••.. " Brief for Appellant at 6-14, 
Waller v. State, 213 S.2d 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968). This Recent Development 
deals only with the double jeopardy issue under the Constitution of the United States. 
2. An included offense has been defined as a lesser offense, related to a greater 
offense in such a way that the greater offense cannot possibly be committed without 
committing the lesser offense. People v. Greer, 30 Cal. 2d 589, 597, 184 P.2d 512, 516-
17 (1947). For a discussion of the general rule in cases in which double jeopardy is 
held to apply to cases of included offenses, see note 31 infra and accompanying text. 
3. Waller v. State, 213 S.2d 623 (1968). Since Waller was decided before Benton v. 
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), discussed in the text accompanying note 13 infra, the 
Florida court was not required to, and did not, reach the question of the application 
of the fifth amendment double jeopardy provisions. This factor leaves in doubt the 
ultimate disposition of the Waller case by the Supreme Court. See note 42 infra. 
4. 395 U.S. 975 (1969). 
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level of government within the state.11 However, Florida's allowance 
of both prosecutions is not unusual. The case law of about half of 
the states conforms to that position, 6 and some federal courts have 
agreed.7 All of the cases supporting that position, including the 
Waller case, were decided while the doctrine enunciated in Palko v. 
Connecticut8 was still good law. That doctrine permitted the states 
to apply their own constitutional provisions against double jeopardy 
and to ignore the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to 
the Federal Constitution. After Palko, the only federal constitutional 
demands that state proceedings were required to meet were the 
demands of procedural due process under the fourteenth amend-
ment.0 Thus, the courts have been able to deal with prosecutions by 
5. This Recent Development focuses on prosecutions by the city and the state for 
an identical act, but the discussion is equally applicable to the question of prosecu• 
tions by states and their political subdivisions generally. 
6. See Comment, Double Jeopardy Where both City and State Prosecute the Same 
Act, 38 WASH. L. REV. 819, 820 n.10 (1963). The following states allow prosecutions 
by both city and state for the same offense: Alabama [Pike v. City of Birmingham, 
36 Ala. App. 53, 53 S.2d 394, cert. denied, 255 Ala. 664, 53 S.2d 396 (1951); Inman v. 
State, 39 Ala. App. 496, 104 S.2d 448 (1958)]; Arkansas [Smith v. State, 136 Ark. 263, 
206 S.W. 437 (1918) (allowing double prosecutions when first trial ends in acquittal)]; 
Florida [Hilliard v. City of Gainesville, 213 S.2d 689 (1968), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 
321 (1969); Gilloley v. Vaughan, 92 Fla. 943, 110 S. 653 (1926); Theisen v. McDavid, 
34 Fla. 440, 16 S. 321 (1894)]; Georgia [Sutton v. Washington, 4 Ga. App. 30, 60 S.E. 
8ll (1908)]: Idaho [State v. Poynter, 70 Idaho 438, 220 P.2d 386 (1950)]; Illinois [City 
of Chicago v. Lord, 3 Ill. App. 2d 410, 122 N.E.2d 439 (1954), afjd., 7 Ill. 2d 379, 130 
N.E.2d 504 (1955)]; Iowa [Town of Neola v. Reichart, 131 Iowa 492, 109 N.W. 5 (1906) 
(dictum)]: Kansas [State v. Holmes, 191 Kan. 126, 379 P .2d 304 (1963); Lawton v. Hand, 
186 Kan. 385, 350 P.2d 28 (1960)]: Louisiana [State v. Fourcade, 45 La. Ann. 717, 13 
S. 187 (1893)]; Maryland [Shafer v. Mumma, 17 Md. 331 (1861)]; Mississippi [May v. 
Town of Carthage, 191 Miss. 97, 2 S.2d 801 (1941); Johnson v. State, 59 Miss. 543 
(1882)]; Missouri [City of St. Louis v. Mueller, 313 S.W.2d 189 (Ct. App. 1958); State 
v. Garner, 360 Mo. 50, 226 S.W.2d 604 (1950)]: Nebraska [State v. Amick, 173 Neb. 
770, ll4 N.W.2d 893 (1962) (dictum); State v. Hauser, 137 Neb. 138, 288 N.W. 518 
(1939)]; Nevada [Ex parte Sloan, 47 Nev. 109, 217 P. 233 (1923)]; New Jersey [State v. 
Reid, 19 N.J. Super. 32, 87 A.2d 562 (1952)]; North Dakota [State v. Simpson, 78 N.D. 
360, 49 N.W .2d 777 (1951)]; Ohio [Koch v. State, 8 Ohio C.C.R. 641 (1894), affd., 53 
Ohio St. 433, 41 N.E. 689 (1895)]: Oklahoma [Booker v. State, 312 P.2d 189 (1957); 
McCann v. State, 82 Okla. Crim. 374, 170 P.2d 562 (1946)]; Oregon [Miller v. Hansen, 
126 Ore. 297, 269 P. 864 (1928)]: Tennessee [Greenwood v. State, 65 Tenn. (6 Baxt.) 
567, 32 Am. R. 539 (1873)]; Virginia [Morganstern v. Commonwealth, 94 Va. 787, 26 
S.E. 402 (1896) (allowing double prosecutions in certain cases but only by statute)]: 
Washington [Bellingham v. Schampera, 57 Wash. 2d 106, 356 P.2d 292 (1960); State v. 
Tucker, 137 Wash. 162, 242 P. 363 (1926)]; West Virginia [Austin v. Knight, 124 W. Va. 
189, 20 S.E.2d 897 (1942); State v. Mills, 108 W. Va. 31, 150 S.E. 142 (1929)]: Wisconsin 
[Guinther v. Milwaukee, 217 Wis. 334, 258 N.W. 865 (1935)]: Wyoming [State v. Jack-
son, 75 Wyo. 13, 291 P.2d 798 (1955) (dictum)]. 
7. Louisiana ex rel. Ladd v. Middlebrooks, 270 F. Supp. 295 (E.D. La. 1967); United 
States v. Farwell, 76 F. Supp. 35 (D. Alas. 1948). 
8. 302 U.S. 319 (1937). 
9. After Palko, then, and before Benton (see note 3 supra and text accompanying 
note 13 infra), fourteenth amendment due process did not include the prohibition 
of double jeopardy. But consecutive city-state proceedings could violate the due pro-
cess clause in other ways, such as if the second trial was considered an attempt to 
"wear the accused out by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials." Hoag v. 
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both a city and a state for the same offense without regard to the 
fifth amendment's prohibition against double jeopardy. In doing so, 
courts have upheld double prosecutions on three basic theories: (I) 
the analogy to decisions which have allowed both the federal govern-
ment and a state to prosecute a defendant when one act has violated 
identical statutes of both;10 (2) the claim that the only way to prevent 
the frustration of state law when local law is enforced is to allow 
both to be enforced;11 and (3) the claim that the municipal prosecu-
tion does not constitute prior jeopardy because only a civil or a petty 
offense is involved.12 
Today, however, the foundation upon which this body of case 
law was built has crumbled. In Benton v. Maryland, 13 decided in 
June of this year, the Supreme Court explicitly extended fifth 
amendment protection against double jeopardy to the states through 
the fourteenth amendment. Palko was specifically overruled to the 
extent that it was inconsistent with the Benton decision. Thus, the 
theories traditionally used to defend prosecutions by both a city and 
a state for the same offense must be examined to determine whether 
they are still valid when the fifth amendment's prohibition against 
double jeopardy is applied to state proceedings. This Recent Devel-
opment examines the implications of the Benton decision for those 
theories. 
The most frequently invoked justification for allowing a double 
prosecution is that a city relates to a state in the same way a state 
government is related to the federal government. If that premise is 
accepted, reliance can be placed on the Supreme Court's application 
of the fifth amendment in Bartkus v. Illinois14 and Abbate v. United 
States.15 In those two decisions the Court held that consecutive pros-
ecutions by a state court and a federal court under statutes pro-
scribing identical activity are not violative of an individual's right 
against double jeopardy.16 Many state courts and some federal dis-
trict courts have relied on the line of authority represented by those 
New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 467 (1958), quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 
{1937). 
IO. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Ladd v. Middlebrooks, 270 F. Supp. 295 (E.D. La. 
1967). 
11. See, e.g., Ex parte Monroe, 13 Okla. Crim. 62, 162 P. 233 (1917); Gross, Succes• 
sive Prosecutions by City and State-The Question of Double Jeopardy, 43 ORE. L. 
REv. 281, 296 (1964). 
12. See, e.g., United States v. Farwell, 76 F. Supp. 35 (D. Alas. 1948); Comment, 
supra note 6, at 820. 
13. 395 U.S. 784 (1969). 
14. 359 U.S. 121 (1959). 
15. 359 U.S. 187 (1959). 
16. The-vitality of those decisions may be questioned after Benton, since ·applica• 
tion to the states of the fifth amendment bar against double jeopardy may preclude 
prosecutions by both state and federal governments. . 
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cases to dispose of the question of consecutive prosecutions by a city 
and a state:17 "It is not double jeopardy ... for one to be tried suc-
cessively in State and Federal prosecutions based upon the same 
act. . . . This same principle applies to acts denounced as crimes 
against both a municipality and a state.''18 
It is submitted, however, that this analogy is unsound. The re-
lationship between the states and the federal government is unique. 
The Union was created by bringing together a group of autonomous 
governmental units, which ceded some of their powers to a central 
government, but which retained certain aspects of their sovereignty. 
Unlike the states, cities do not exercise autonomous authority; they 
exercise only those powers delegated to them by the states. Their 
judicial systems are created by, and derive their powers solely from, 
the state government. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has recog-
nized the subordinate status of municipalities and has emphasized 
the inapplicability of the federal-state analogy.19 
A closer parallel to the city-state relationship is the relationship 
between a territory of the United States and the federal govern-
ment,20 for a territory, like a city, is a completely subordinate 
administrative unit. The Supreme Court has noted the importance 
of that subordinate status for purposes of double jeopardy: 
The Government of a State does not derive its powers from the 
United States, while the Government of the Philippines owes its exis-
tence wholly to the United States .... So that the cases holding that 
the same acts committed in a State of the Union may constitute 
an offense against the United States and also a distinct offense against 
the state do not apply here, where the two tribunals that tried the 
accused exert all their powers under and by authority of the same 
government .... 21 
17. E.g., Louisiana ex rel. Ladd v. Middlebrooks, 270 F. Supp. 295 (E.D. La. 1967); 
United States v. Farwell, 76 F. Supp. 35 (D. Alas. 1948); Mccann v. State, 82 Okla. 
Crim. 374, 170 P.2d 562 (1946); State v. Tucker, 137 Wash. 162, 242 P. 363 (1926). The 
holdings in Bartkus and Abbate were not novel. See United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 
377 (1922); Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852) (dictum); Fox v. Ohio, 46 
U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847) (dictum). 
18. Louisiana ex rel. Ladd v. Middlebrooks, 270 F. Supp. 295, 296 (E.D. La. 1967). 
19. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964): 
Political subdivisions of states-counties, cities, or whatever-never were and 
never have been considered as sovereignties. Rather they have been regarded as 
subordinate governmental instrumentalities created by the State to assist in the 
carrying out of state governmental functions. As stated by the Court in Hunter v. 
City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178, these governmental units are "created as 
convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State 
as may be entrusted to them" and the "number, nature, and duration of the pow-
ers conferred upon [them] and the territory over which they shall be exercised 
rests in the absolute discretion of the state." The relationship of the States to 
the Federal Government could hardly be less analogous. 
20. See Comment, supra note 6, at 822. 
21. Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 354-55 (1907). See also Puerto Rico v. 
Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253 (1937). 
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It is apparent, then, that the concept of dual sovereignty is inap-
plicable to the city-state relationship. Consequently, it cannot justify 
prosecutions by both of those two levels of government under 
separate laws which define identical offenses. 
The second justification for allowing prosecutions by both the 
city and the state for the same offense is based on a fear, on the part 
of some state courts, that a rule which barred states from prosecuting 
those previously tried by a city for the identical act would in some in-
stances allow defendants to escape with relatively light sentences, 
since penalties for municipal offenses tend to be less severe than 
those prescribed by states.22 That justification, however, cannot 
withstand close scrutiny. Since cities are entirely creatures of the 
states, the latter could establish comprehensive statutory schemes to 
ensure that their rights to prosecute wrongdoers are not impaired.23 
A state might require, for example, that after an arrest for acts which 
violate both municipal and state law, the state be notified by the 
municipality, prior to the municipality's prosecution, in order to 
afford the state the option of prosecuting the defendant under state 
law. Such a system would preserve concurrent jurisdiction and 
would assure municipal officials that a suspect arrested by them 
would be prosecuted.24 But whatever the system, thoughtful legisla-
tion to meet the problems that arise from overlap between state 
statutes and municipal ordinances is greatly preferable to the hasty 
sacrifice of an individual's right to be free from double jeopardy. 
However, the problems of overlapping municipal ordinances 
and state statutes can be met even without establishing statutory 
schemes. Indeed, such solutions have been reached by the courts of 
some states that presently disallow city-state prosecutions. Those 
courts have held that when municipal and state ordinances define 
the same offense, the municipal ordinance is void.25 It is clear, then, 
22. Ex parte Monroe, 13 Okla. Crim. 62, 69-70, 162 P. 233, 236 (1917): 
[I]t is generally held that, if the offense [the city] has dealt with is also an offense 
against the state, the offender may then be turned over to the state, and cannot 
plead former jeopardy by reason of the penalty imposed by police court. Why is 
this? One reason is because it is contemplated that the penalty the city may im-
pose is so small that it is tantamount to no punishment for the offense • • • if 
the city could be permitted to assess a penalty commensurate with the gravity of 
the offense, then no court and no rule of justice would permit the offender to 
again be punished for the same offense. 
See also Gross, Successive Prosecutions by City and State-The Question of Double 
Jeopardy, 43 ORE. L. REV. 281, 296 (1964). 
23. See Note, Constitutional Law: Successive Municipal and State Prosecutions 
Found Permissible Despite Assumed Application of Double Jeopardy, 1968 DUKE L.J. 
362, 380-82. 
24. Id. at 381. 
25. In re Sic, 73 Cal. 142, 14 P. 405 (1887); Billings v. Herold, Il!O Mont. 138, 296 
P .2d 263 (1956); State v. Keith, 94 N.C. 933, 934 (1886). Similar schemes providing for 
effective pre-emption of local ordinances by state law are embodied in some state 
statutes. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-154 (1960); GA. CONST. art. I,. § 4; IND. ANN. STAT. 
§ 9-2402 (1956); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 45-6-6 (1956). See also Gross, Successive Prose-
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that the punishment of serious offenders under state law is not in-
compatible with the protection of individuals from double jeopardy. 
Moreover, consecutive trials of a defendant based upon the same 
act are not always barred by the fifth amendment. That amendment's 
prohibition against double jeopardy is violated only when the trials 
are for the "same offense" or when the first trial is for an included 
offense.26 With respect to the "same offense" test, the Supreme Court 
commented in United States v. Ewell: 
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall "be subject for 
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." That 
clause, designed to prohibit double jeopardy as well as double 
punishment, is not properly invoked to bar a second prosecution 
unless the "same offence" is involved in both the first and second 
trials. The identity of offenses is, therefore, a recurring issue in 
double jeopardy cases ... . 21 
Thus, if the violation of an ordinance and the violation of a statute 
can be shown to constitute different substantive offenses, consecutive 
prosecutions are possible, subject to due process limitations,28 even 
if both violations arose out of the same physical acts.29 The test 
generally employed to determine whether offenses are different or 
identical, is the "same evidence" test. Under that test, the second 
offense is considered to be the same as the first when the evidence 
required to support a conviction in the second case would have been 
sufficient to sustain a conviction in the first.30 
cutions by City and State-The Question of Double Jeopardy, 43 ORE. L. REv. 281, 
291-94 (1964); Note, supra note 23, at 368 n.31. 
26. For a discussion of included offenses, see note 2 supra and note 31 infra. 
27. 383 U.S. 116, 124 (1966). See also Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911). 
28. Even if the protection against double jeopardy is not violated, there could 
theoretically be a denial of due process if the retrial involved an attempt to wear 
down the accused. See note 9 supra. 
29. In a series of cases involving drugs, the Supreme Court has found more than 
one offense arising out of the same acts: Harris v. United States, 359 U.S. 19 (1959); 
Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 
(1932). See also Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911). 
30. The "same evidence" test-sometimes called the "fact" test-is the one that 
has been traditionally used by the Supreme Court. 
It is true that the acts and words of the accused set forth in both charges are 
the same, but in the second case it was charged, as was essential to the conviction, 
that the misbehavior in deed and words was addressed to a public official. In this 
view we are of the opinion that while the transaction charged is the same in each 
case, the offenses are different. 
Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911). A recent case in the Ninth Circuit, 
Barnett v. Gladden, 375 F.2d 235 (1967), demonstrates how the "same evidence" test 
can work to limit the effect of applying the fifth amendment. The defendant in 
Barnett accosted two young girls and offered them money if they would have sexual 
relations with him. He was tried and convicted under a municipal ordinance which 
prohibited a male from making improper advances or indecent remarks to, or seeking 
impertinently to attract the attention of, female persons in public. The defendant was 
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With respect to included offenses, the test is very similar: "[t]he 
general rule is that a prosecution for a minor offense included in a 
greater will bar a prosecution for the greater, if on an indictment 
for the greater the accused can be convicted of the lesser.''31 Again, 
it is clear that the fact that both prosecutions arise from the same 
incident is not enough in itself to preclude the second prosecution. 
In general, although a prohibition of prosecutions by both a 
city and a state for the same offense may create some law enforce-
ment difficulties, the legislatures of the states, as previously noted, 
have the power to act to resolve those problems.32 Moreover, in view 
of the limitations on the cases to which the protection against double 
jeopardy applies, possible problems in law enforcement do not appear 
to be serious enough to preclude extending such protection to city-
state prosecutions. 
The final theory which courts have used to uphold double 
subsequently tried and convicted under a state provision that made it a crime for 
a person over sixteen years of age willfully or wrongfully to entice a child under six-
teen years of age to any place of concealment with the intent to commit a prohibited 
sex act. The petitioner argued that this double prosecution was a violation of bis 
protection against double jeopardy. The court found no support for bis claim since 
the elements essential for conviction under the ordinance and those essential for con-
viction under the statute were different; each required the proof of an element not 
needed for conviction under the other. Therefore, the court concluded, two separate 
offenses were defined and the prohibition of double jeopardy was not applicable. 
Some members of the Supreme Court, however, have called for tests other than 
the "same evidence" test. Justice Douglas, for example, has argued for a "trans-
action" test. In his dissent in Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 478 (1958), he con-
tended that since "[t]be criminal transaction ••• was indivisible, [that is,] [t]be time 
and place was [sic] the same," separate prosecutions for multiple robberies should 
be barred. Another view bas been expressed in dissent by former Chief Justice 
Warren [Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1958)), and has been fol· 
lowed in several cases. Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959); Ladner v. 
United States, 358 U.S. 169 (1958). See also Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955). 
According to that view, there are some instances in which the legislative intent in 
creating several offenses was to give the prosecution a choice of statutes under which 
it could prosecute, not the power to prosecute under all the statutes. In such instances, 
when one transgression violated several of those statutes, double prosecution should 
not be allowed. See Rosenthal, Dangerous Drug Legislation in the United States, 45 
TEXAS L. R.Ev. 1037, 1152-53 &: n.512 (1967). For a general discussion of these tests, 
see Notes and Comments, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262 (1965). 
31. Giles v. United States, 157 F.2d 588, 590 (9th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, !!31 U.S. 
813 (1947). For a definition of an included offense, see note 2 supra. The included 
offense situation is illustrated by People v. Manago, 230 Cal. App. 2d 645, 41 Cal. 
Rptr. 260 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964). In that case, the defendant was arrested rummaging 
through lockers in an employees' locker room at a store. He was also found to be 
carrying a straight razor. He was convicted under a municipal ordinance making it 
illegal to bide or loiter upon the premises of another while carrying a concealed 
weapon; subsequently, be was convicted of burglary under a state statute. The de-
fendant appealed the second conviction claiming that the first conviction was an in-
cluded offense of burglary and that the second prosecution was thus barred. The 
California court disagreed, although it did find the prosecution to be barred by a 
state statute. 
32. See text accompanying notes 23-24 supra. 
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prosecutions is that the city's prosecution constitutes either a civil or 
a petty proceeding, and that the federal constitutional protection 
against double jeopardy does not apply to such proceedings.33 The 
decisions following that line of reasoning have forced the courts to 
face a very confusing and difficult problem-that of distinguishing 
civil actions from criminal prosecutions and serious criminal offenses 
from petty ones.34 One branch of the civil-petty argument is that 
prosecutions for violations of a municipal ordinance are civil pro-
ceedings and therefore do not raise the specter of double jeopardy. 
But as cities punish an increasing variety of such offenses with in-
creasingly severe penalties,35 the civil-criminal distinction becomes 
illusory. The threat of a prolonged incarceration or deprivation of 
freedom for the violation of a municipal ordinance constitutes real 
jeopardy and makes the offense, in effect, criminal for double 
jeopardy purposes. As one federal judge has commented: 
Ineluctable logic leads to the conclusion that the constitutional 
protection against double jeopardy, as is the case with the right of 
counsel and the privilege against self-incrimination, is applicable to 
all proceedings, irrespective of whether they are denominated 
criminal or civil, if the outcome may be deprivation of the liberty 
of the person.sa 
But even if a court allows a subsequent state prosecution by 
applying the term "civil" to prior municipal offenses which carry a 
jail sentence, the court cannot avoid conflict with the fifth amend-
33. For a discussion of cases employing this principle, see Comment, supra note 6, 
at 822•25. See also United States v. Farwell, 76 F. Supp. 35 (D. Alas. 1967); Fisher, 
Double Jeopard-y: Six Common Boners Summarized, 15 UCLA L. REv. 81, 94 (1967): 
Though the reasoning of these decisions fallowing double prosecution] is 
palpably unsound, something can be said for the result. It can be defended on 
the entirely different ground • • • that constitutional rights can be disregarded 
in petty cases. I believe that this is the real reason for the unwillingness of so 
many courts to respect the criminal judgments of municipalities. 
34. For a brief history of the development of this theory and of the problems 
that have plagued courts in trying to decide which criminal procedural safeguards 
apply to municipal prosecutions and which ones do not, see Gross, Successive Prose-
cutions by City and State-The Question of Double Jeopardy, 43 ORE. L. REv. 281 
(1964). 
35. See Gross, supra note 34, at 314: 
Where once successive prosecutions by city and state could be condoned be-
cause of the insignificance of municipal punishment, today that is no longer the 
case. Municipal prosecutions, exercising authority unparalleled at common law, 
meting out penafties comparable to those imposed by higher state authority, can 
be considered as nothing less than prosecutions by the state itself. 
See also Denninger v. Recorder's Court, 145 Cal. 629, 70 P. 360 (1904); Ocean Springs 
v. Green, 77 Miss. 472, 27 S. 743 (1900); Komen v. St. Louis, 316 Mo. 9, 289 S.W. 838 
(1926); Notes and Comments, Reprosecution of Ordinance Violations as Constituting 
Double Jeopardy, 45 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 90 (1968). One example of a state statute 
allowing cities to impose the same penalty that the state imposes for the same offense 
is Allie. STAT. ANN. § 19-2410 (1956) (applicable ouly to misdemeanors). 
36. United States v. Dickerson, 168 F. Supp. 899, 901 (D.D.C. 1958), revd. on other 
grounds, 271 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959). 
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ment, which proscribes not only double punishments, but also 
double trials. The Supreme Court stated in its wide-ranging con-
sideration of double jeopardy in Green v. United States: 
The underlying idea ... is that the State with all its resources and 
power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict 
an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to em-
barrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a 
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the 
possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.37 
An individual confronted with a jail sentence for violation of a 
municipal ordinance is forced to endure all of those hardships. 
Hence, to allow the state to indict and try him again for the same 
offense under a state statute is to subject him to precisely the same 
evils that the court condemned in Green.38 In short, if a jail sentence 
may be imposed, there is no cognizable difference between criminal 
and civil prosecutions for the purpose of fifth amendment protection 
against double jeopardy. ' 
The other branch of the civil-petty argument is that, even if 
violations of municipal ordinances are essentially criminal, they are 
of such a petty nature that constitutional safeguards do not extend 
to them. In Duncan v. Louisiana,39 the Supreme Court accepted that 
position with respect to the sixth amendment right to jury trial. But 
it does not appear to have drawn the distinction for the purposes of 
fifth amendment protections. It is likely that the major considera-
tion in Duncan was the Court's concern for the efficient administra-
tion of justice. A guarantee of a jury trial in every criminal case 
would result in greater expense and in increased congestion in the 
37. 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). These considerations of double exposure to the 
rigors of a trial might appear to militate against the settled state of the law in one 
area. It is clear that the government may prosecute a defendant for the same crime 
in both a criminal action and a purely civil action. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 
391 (1938); State v. Gustin, 152 Mo. 108, 53 S.W. 421 (1899); Atkinson v. Parsekian, 
37 N.J. 143, 179 A.2d 732 (1962); Stai:e v. Williams, 21 N.J. Misc. 329, 34 A.2d 141 
(1943). That double criminal-civil prosecution would be permissible, for example, in 
a case in which the defendant had intentionally injured government property. In 
such a case, a double prosecution would subject him to the same embarrassment, ex-
pense, and ordeal as it would in the situation at hand. But there is a crucial differ-
ence between the double prosecution for both a criminal and a purely civil offense 
and prosecution for the violation of both a municipal ordinance and a state statute. 
The difference is that in the former case the defendant does not twice risk the pos• 
sibility of penal sanctions and deprivation of liberty, whereas in the latter he does. 
It is primarily that double risk of penal sanctions, more than the other considera-
tions, that the fifth amendment seeks to prohibit. 
38. See generally Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 169 (1873): 
The common law not only prohibited a second punishment for the same of-
fence, but it went further and forbid a second trial for the same offence, whether 
the accused had suffered punishment or not, and whether in the former trial he 
had been acquitted or convicted. 
39. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
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courts. The consideration of efficiency, however, does not apply to 
the guarantee of the right to be free from double jeopardy. Indeed, 
extension of that right could only ease the burden on the courts by 
eliminating the reprosecutions that are presently allowed. 
Thus, neither the language of the fifth amendment itself nor the 
cases that have construed it preclude extending the protection 
against double jeopardy to all actions in which a defendant is faced 
with penal sanction. There need be no fear that such universal ap-
plication of the protection against double jeopardy will allow a de-
fendant to escape state punishment for a serious crime when he has 
been prosecuted on the municipal level for an included minor of-
fense. As has been demonstrated, both limitations on the use of 
double jeopardy and the opportunity for state legislation to alleviate 
law enforcement problems should enable states to see that justice is 
done.40 
In conclusion, Waller has given the Supreme Court an opportu-
nity for the first time to consider the constitutionality of prosecutions 
by both a city and a state for the same offense.41 Since, under Benton, 
the double jeopardy, clause of the fifth amendment now applies to 
the states, the arguments in favor of such prosecutions will have to 
be considered in light of that clause. 42 The Court, in making its 
40. See text accompanying notes 23-32 supra. 
41. Although the Florida court in Waller relied on the dual sovereignty analogy, 
rather than the other arguments in favor of permitting double prosecution, the Su-
preme Court will probably have to deal with all of them in order to dispose com-
pletely of the double jeopardy question. 
42. It is possible, however, that since the Florida court in Waller did not consider 
the application of the fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy, and since 
that decision was made prior to Benton, the Court might refuse to apply Benton 
retroactively and decide 'Waller's appeal without reference to the fifth amendment. 
But that course of action is unlikely. The fact that the Court set Waller for argu-
ment immediately after Ashe v. Swenson, 399 F.2d 40 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. granted, 
393 U.S. 1115 (1969) (defendant who had been tried and acquitted of robbing one of 
six participants in a poker game not deprived of due process by subsequent trial and 
conviction for robbing another of the participants), suggests that it intends to address 
itself to the fifth amendment question with respect to the city-state situation. 
If the Court applies the fifth amendment to this situation, there are two ways in 
which it could dispose of the Waller case. First, it could apply Benton only prospec-
tively, that is, it could decide that the fifth amendment would not apply to Waller 
or to any prior cases, but would apply to city-state prosecutions subsequent to the 
date of the decision in Waller. On the other hand-and it is submitted that this 
would be the better disposition-Benton could be applied retroactively. The Court 
has taken several approaches in making its constitutional rulings retroactive. For ex-
ample, it has held, on occasion, that a change in the law will be given effect in cases 
on direct review. See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). It has also held 
that a constitutional decision is retroactive if the trial of the case that might be af-
fected by it began before the date of the constitutional decision. See, e.g., Johnson v. 
New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). In that case, the Court said that retroactivity does 
not in any sense turn on the "importance" of the right involved, but instead involves 
a balancing of how seriously the administration of criminal justice would be disrupted 
and how adequate the safeguards for the defendants had been under prior case law. 
384 U.S. at 728-29. Since Waller is a case on direct appeal, and since its decision in 
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determination, should reject all three theories under which double
prosecutions have been upheld, and should apply the double
jeopardy provisions to the city-state situation. If it does so, the
Waller case will turn on the question that the Florida court refused
to decide-whether the municipal prosecution was for an offense
identical to, or included in, the state crime charged.43 Exactly how
the Court will dispose of that issue is unclear; but the Court should
take this opportunity to hold that, at least henceforth, 44 no defendant
may be subject to prosecutions both by the city and by the state for
the identical offense.
accordance with Benton would probably not present a serious threat to the admin-
istration of criminal justice, the court might well apply Benton retroactively to the
Waller case. If it does not wish to make a complete retroactive application, the Court
could apply Benton only to cases arising on direct appeal, and not to cases collaterally
attacking convictions. That course of action would give Waller a remedy but would
limit the impact on other past city-state prosecutions.
43. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
44. See the discussion of the prospective or retroactive application of Benton in
note 42 supra.
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